background Ebola virus disease (EVD) can be clinically severe and highly fatal, making surveillance efforts for early disease detection of paramount importance. In areas with limited access to laboratory testing, the Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) strategy in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) may be a vital tool in improving outbreak response.
Introduction
Ebola virus disease (EVD), or Ebola, was first identified in 1976 in Yambuku, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC-former Zaire) and southern Sudan [1, 2] . EVD can be clinically severe and frequently fatal, affecting both humans and non-human primates. Ebola is caused by five known viruses within the family Filoviridae, genus Ebolavirus (Ebola virus, EBOV; Bundibugyo virus, BDBV; Ta€ ı Forest virus, TAFV; Sudan virus, SUDV; and Reston virus, RESTV), with only the first four known to infect humans [1, 3, 4] .
EVD case fatality rates have varied from 25 to 90% among the Central and West African outbreaks [1, 3, 4] , and encompassed a spectrum of clinical signs and symptoms ranging from the non-specific -characterised by fever, vomiting, abdominal pain, headache and diarrhoea -to severe haemorrhagic complications [1, 5, 6] . A total of seven confirmed EVD outbreaks have occurred in the DRC (all due to EBOV, with the exception of the 2012 †The views presented in this material are those of the author and not of the United States Army Medical Department Center and School or of Army Medicine.
Isiro outbreak caused by BDBV). All DRC events have been small relative to the 2013-2016 West African outbreak, affecting mostly geographically isolated populations [3, [7] [8] [9] . The recent EVD epidemic in West Africa, a region with no known history of outbreaks aside from a single non-fatal case in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire caused by TAFV in 1994 [3, 10] , has highlighted the importance of disease tracking and monitoring and displayed the fragility of health systems that lack strong surveillance structures [11] .
In regions with limited health infrastructure and resources, proper and timely disease reporting facilitates rapid identification and early response to emerging epidemics before they impact large populations, becoming difficult to control [12] . Surveillance systems promoting early detection and management of increased disease trends are critical for limiting disease transmission during outbreaks [13] . Since 1998, the Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) system has been used to track diseases like EVD and to strengthen public health surveillance efforts among World Health Organization (WHO) member states [14] . The primary goals of the IDSR have been to enable early detection of clinical symptoms and signs of epidemic potential [14, 15] and to track priority disease trends over time to inform public health programming, resource allocation and policy interventions that facilitate the prevention and control of infectious diseases [16] . The IDSR system is described in detail in the Methods.
Because IDSR passive surveillance reporting is based on clinical assessment rather than laboratory confirmation of disease, there is a potential for case misdiagnosis. For instance, in early stages of an EVD outbreak, reporting differential diagnoses of EVD (diseases that share similar clinical presentation to EVD [17] ) endemic to the local area may be more likely due to the non-specific symptoms EVD shares with more common tropical diseases [13, 18] . In the 1976 Yambuku outbreak, for example, the initial patients were provisionally diagnosed with malaria, typhoid or yellow fever [1, 19] , while patients presenting with haemorrhagic diarrhoea in the 1995 Kikwit outbreak were initially thought to be infected with Shigella species [18, 20] .
This study uses DRC's IDSR passive surveillance data collected between 2006 and 2014 during four EVD outbreaks in three locations in DRC: Mweka (2007), Mweka (2008) , Isiro (2012) and Boende (2014). Passive surveillance consists of routine, mandated disease reporting from health facilities, while active surveillance involves decisive effort by public health organisations to obtain case data [21] . While passive surveillance relies on routine incidence reporting by trained health care workers as they encounter cases during regular activities, active surveillance involves a special, concerted effort by the health care community to search for new cases of disease and confirm them with laboratory testing (as opposed to relying on these cases to show up at hospitals and health care centres when patients fall ill and seek care). By comparing active surveillance data to previously and independently collected passive surveillance data, we attempt to characterise the ability of the passive IDSR system to detect suspect cases of viral hemorrhagic fever (VHF) during each outbreak and to describe reporting trends for VHFs and other differential diagnoses of EVD endemic to Ebola-affected areas. For clarity and simplicity, we will henceforth refer to any disease/syndrome/ symptom within IDSR as 'disease' and any disease report as 'case', even though a case reported through IDSR is not based on laboratory confirmation.
Methods

IDSR system
Implemented in the DRC in 2000 [14, 15] , the IDSR is designed to identify emerging disease situations, monitor trends and reliably transmit data to the appropriate level of the health care system (whether provincial, national or international). To comply with IDSR standards, the Direction for Disease Control of the DRC's Ministry of Health (MoH) mandates that health care workers operating throughout the country at various health facilities (local health centres, district hospitals and tertiary care centres) are trained to recognise and report suspected cases of disease according to a national surveillance guidance document [15] . To this end, they disseminate periodically updated lists of reportable diseases and their accompanying standard case definitions as defined by WHO (Table S2) , and provide standard operating procedures to health facilities for recording and reporting relevant incidence data to their respective Central Health Zone (HZ) Offices (HZs are sub-provincial health administrative areas), which are then tasked with transferring that information up the national surveillance chain. Trained clinicians at health facilities are also charged with the collection, storage and shipment of biological specimens from patients with suspected reportable diseases to the HZ level, but this information has not been recorded systematically as part of IDSR records and was not available for analysis.
DRC policy mandates that IDSR data from HZs fall into categories of immediate, weekly (Table S1 ), monthly and quarterly notification levels, depending on disease. Although our study focuses on weekly notifiable diseases, some diseases appear on both immediate and weekly notification lists (yellow fever, viral hemorrhagic fever and novel influenza (classified as acute respiratory infection (ARI)). Information regarding diseases on the immediate notification list is to be sent as quickly as possible via telephone, short message service (SMS), email or radio to the health zone leadership team. Following this immediate notification, any case data falling under weekly notification (including for diseases also found on the immediate notification list) should be compiled into a weekly electronic report that summarises the total number of suspect cases and deaths observed during the week for each listed disease. Situation reports (SITREPS) and epidemiologic bulletins are sent through the WHO to inform the public health community of significant health concerns. Depending on the disease category, IDSR has various protocols for what level of disease reporting warrants an alert or a response, for example, in the case of malaria, an intervention is warranted when the number of new malaria case reports exceeds the upper level of number of cases observed in the same time period from non-epidemic previous years [15] .
Data sources and study population
The IDSR identifies suspect cases of weekly reportable diseases at the health facility level and relays them to the corresponding HZ (one of 516 in DRC) where they are aggregated into electronic weekly reports. Data are then forwarded to the provincial level and compiled at the national level [15, 22] . Standard case definitions for diseases examined within DRC's IDSR weekly reportable disease list are shown in Table S2 [15] . Although all health care workers are required to notify their corresponding HZs of any reportable disease incidence encountered (as described above), use of IDSR standard case definitions has been found to vary both by health worker and facility due to differences in training, experience and disease detection guidance materials available [23, 24] .
Malaria, meningitis, typhoid fever, acute respiratory infection (ARI), yellow fever, measles and bloody diarrhoea are diseases included within IDSR weekly reports and considered differential diagnoses for EVD based on public health guidance and previous literature [5, 19, 25] . Malaria, meningitis, typhoid fever, yellow fever and bloody diarrhoea share non-specific symptoms of fever, abdominal pain, diarrhoea and vomiting [5, 6, 26] . Measles and ARI cases can also manifest fever and malaise at the early stages of the clinical course, although symptoms differ from Ebola with disease progression [27, 28] . Yellow fever, measles and bloody diarrhoea were excluded from analyses due to low health zone reporting.
We examined four EVD outbreaks that took place after IDSR implementation (2007-2014) ( Figure S1 ). Two separate sets of surveillance data were examined (active and passive) during each outbreak, and although there are likely individuals reported as VHF cases through the IDSR (passive) system that were later detected by active surveillance with laboratory confirmation, the two systems are not linked and reports are not shared between systems. Data for EVD cases collected through active surveillance during the four outbreak periods were obtained from the DRC MoH, Direction for Disease Control. These data include the official suspect, probable and confirmed cases for each outbreak by HZ. Support for active disease surveillance activities during outbreaks has come from the DRC Ministry of Public Health, WHO, M edecin sans Fronti eres (MSF), numerous other non-governmental partners, the Institute National de Recherche Biom edicale (INRB) laboratory in Kinshasa in addition to foreign laboratories, as well as visiting scientists and public health specialists from around the world [29, 30] . Date of symptom onset was considered the incident date for all suspect, probable and confirmed cases, however, for the 2007 Mweka outbreak, date of notification was used as a proxy for symptom onset as this information was unavailable. To compare passive versus active surveillance reporting trends, VHF suspect cases reported to IDSR (passive surveillance) were extracted and overlaid on official MoH (active surveillance) epidemic curves of EVD cases during outbreak periods. To indicate progression of the outbreaks, lines representing outbreak alerts and final cases were included based on previous reports [7] [8] [9] .
Scatter plots: differential diagnoses EVD differential diagnoses were plotted from 2007-2014 (data from 2006-2014 included for the Mweka 2007 outbreak) to assess reporting trends over the course of EVD outbreaks. Although, as previously mentioned, IDSR collected data does not include laboratory confirmation, to indicate progression of the outbreaks, lines representing the index case detected by official MoH implemented active surveillance, outbreak notification date (following laboratory confirmation), and final Ebola case were included based on previous reports [7] [8] [9] .
Statistical analyses
To examine changes in reporting of selected differential diagnoses, case counts were assessed for two comparable time periods unique to each EVD outbreak: the index and pre-index periods. Because IDSR cases are reported by epidemiologic week, the index period was defined as the time in weeks from index case to date of EVD outbreak notification (following laboratory confirmation of EVD) while the pre-index period was defined as the equivalent time period prior to the index period, calculated as the same number of weeks as the index period. For example, during the Mweka (2008) outbreak, there were 5 weeks between the index case and notification, thus the index period included weeks 48-52 while the pre-index period included weeks 43-47 (5 weeks prior to the index period).
Incidences (I) for differential diagnoses during each EVD outbreak were calculated using populations reported in the IDSR for affected HZs both individually and for total HZs involved in a given outbreak. As a summary measure for all affected health zones, per cent change was calculated for differential diagnoses ((index period I -pre-index period I)/pre-index period I) for each outbreak. As per cent change is not an informative measure when the baseline value is 0 (due to low disease reporting), an indication of increase (+), decrease (À) or no change (NC) was provided for individual HZs by outbreak.
Analyses were completed using SPSS Version 20 (IBM Corp., Armonk, NY) and SAS software, Version 9.4 (SAS Institute, Cary, NC). Our study was deemed exempt from IRB review by the University of California, Los Angeles.
Results
There were 416 suspected, probable and confirmed EVD cases recorded in the official MoH reports across the four outbreaks examined (Figure 1 ). Suspected cases of EVD are defined in Table S2 ; probable cases of EVD are defined as deceased suspected cases with an epidemiological link to a confirmed case; and confirmed EVD cases are defined as suspected or probable cases with laboratory confirmation of infection (positive IgM antibody, positive PCR or viral isolation) [31] . Rosello et al. have compiled the outbreak-specific case definitions unique to DRC [8] . 
Despite variation among individual HZs, overall summary measures of all areas involved in the outbreaks revealed an increase of suspect malaria and typhoid fever cases in comparing the index and pre-index period reports (Table 1) . ARI was not reported in the outbreak areas during 2007 and 2008, and reporting trends of ARI in 2012 and 2014 were mixed, with some HZs (Isiro, Rungu, Viadana and Wema) experiencing increases and the remainder (Dungu, Pawa and Boende) experiencing decreases or no change in incidence estimates.
During the 2007 outbreak, IDSR reports of meningitis increased slightly during the index period while a large spike of typhoid fever cases was reported just prior to the outbreak notification date (Figure 2 ). During the 2008 outbreak, there was a slight increase in typhoid fever cases during the index period while malaria cases rose directly after the final EVD case, 1 week after official notification through active surveillance during this short outbreak (Figure 3 ). An increase of malaria cases also occurred around the index period of the 2012 outbreak ( Figure 4) . Although typhoid fever cases were not reported until late March of 2012 (the 2012 Isiro outbreak began in early June), this disease trend appears to decrease after a peak around the index period as well. In the most recent outbreak (Boende, 2014), there were typhoid fever reports around the index period, but the cases were few in number and a distinct upward trend was not seen ( Figure 5 ).
Discussion
Our results point to three key findings: first, although data were collected independently for both systems, there was close similarity in the MoH active and IDSR passive surveillance reports, suggesting that the IDSR system may be useful in early recognition of EVD at the HZ level. Second, delays in both passive surveillance reporting (as in the 2014 Boende outbreak) and laboratory confirmation of actively surveilled cases are too long and must be improved. Finally, increases in IDSR trends of malaria and typhoid fever may aid in early identification of an EVD outbreak in the event that laboratory confirmation is delayed.
Overall, passive and active surveillance reports were similar in number across all 2007-2014 outbreaks (438 IDSR VHF and 416 EVD cases, respectively). Both Mweka outbreaks (2007 and 2008) reported differences of only one case or no difference, respectively, between active and passive surveillance, while Isiro (2012) and Boende (2014) outbreaks reported differences of only 11 (52 active, 63 passive) and 10 (68 active, 78 passive) cases, respectively. Additionally, for the 2007, 2008 and 2012 outbreaks, passive surveillance VHF case reports closely coincided with the EVD active surveillance epidemic curve. Importantly, initial case reports overlapped in these outbreaks, thus the similarities in the active and passive surveillance systems suggest that the IDSR may have utility in early recognition of EVD cases during outbreak periods. The findings in our study warrant quantification of IDSR's sensitivity during EVD outbreaks to provide data that can further target improvements in DRC's disease surveillance infrastructure. However, such sensitivity analysis may only be undertaken with regular and reliable recording of laboratory confirmation testing for all IDSR suspected cases.
Despite the similarities in case counts noted above, there were lags in both IDSR case reporting and EVD laboratory confirmation. The reporting lag occurred during the 2014 Boende outbreak, when the IDSR system did not detect VHF cases until approximately three weeks after the index case. This could reflect local resource and communication system constraints, as suggested by § §A 5 week timeframe was used to calculate pre-index (5 weeks prior to index case) and index periods (5 weeks between index case and notification). ¶ ¶A 12 week timeframe was used to calculate pre-index (12 weeks prior to index case) and index periods (12 weeks between index case and notification). † † †A 4 week timeframe was used to calculate pre-index (4 weeks prior to index case) and index periods (4 weeks between index case and notification).
Mboera and colleagues [32] , that require further investigation. While a notable lag occurred between initial IDSR VHF case reports and official outbreak notification (and thus laboratory confirmation), an improvement was observed in more recent outbreaks (from 23 weeks in 2007 to approximately 5 weeks in 2008-2014). During Mweka (2007), Ebola was not recognised until well into the outbreak, possibly due to ongoing concurrent outbreaks of typhoid fever and shigellosis [33] . This time lag should still be shortened, and with earlier outbreak confirmation, subsequent response and containment efforts may occur more efficiently and so mitigate EVD's impact on populations and health systems. Among the reportable diseases examined, malaria showed the most consistent increases during outbreak periods, followed by typhoid fever. Overall, the prevalence of both malaria (approximately 3000 cases estimated per 10 000 population in 2015) [34] and typhoid fever (>10 cases estimated per 10 000 population in 2010) [35] is high in DRC, making potential misdiagnosis of EVD cases, which occur much less frequently, a concern. Malaria and typhoid fever can be difficult to distinguish from Ebola due to their shared non-specific symptoms [36] , and malaria was the most frequently misreported diagnosis among EVD patients during the 2012 outbreak [37] . Important to note, however, are simultaneous outbreaks of other diseases, such as concurrent outbreaks of typhoid fever and shigellosis [8, 38] , malaria and shigellosis [39] , and malaria during the Mweka (2007), Mweka (2008) and Isiro (2012) outbreaks [40] , respectively, raising concerns regarding lack of EVD recognition due to misdiagnosis or co-morbid conditions. Additionally, the potential of asymptomatic or mild EBOV infection, as noted in the Yambuku and Kikwit outbreaks [1, 41] , highlights the possibility of underdetection and misclassification of mild EBOV cases. Our results highlight the fact that examining trends of IDSR reported diseases that are symptomatically similar to EVD in conjunction with VHF reports may promote early identification of EVD outbreaks, and in the case of known concurrent outbreaks, care should be taken to train health care workers (HCW) to be aware of the possibility of co-morbidity or misdiagnosis of EVD. Although the effectiveness of surveillance systems for early EVD identification has been previously assessed [42] , to our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the application of IDSR surveillance during EVD outbreaks, as well as to examine reporting trends of EVD differential diagnoses during EVD outbreaks. There are several limitations in this study. First, we were unable to differentiate between the absence of cases and the absence of surveillance activity for some diseases, thus limiting our ability to interpret periods of no reporting (as outbreaks). Gaps in reporting within individual HZs could reflect local challenges, such as resource limitations or personnel shortages that should be examined and addressed. Reporting gaps in the IDSR system are compatible with findings in Ghana which suggest that inconsistent reports likely stem from a variety of factors including health worker attitudes [43] . Additionally, as discussed above, simultaneous outbreaks and the possibility of concurrent conditions or co-morbidities, particularly in areas where malaria, typhoid, dysentery and other diseases are endemic, limit our ability to interpret these increased trends in malaria and typhoid fever IDSR cases [38] . Criteria are needed for HCW and HZ responses, including indices for successful detection, specimen collection, laboratory confirmation and reporting. Next, IDSR data are not linked to active surveillance cases, so it was not possible to quantify the sensitivity of IDSR in identifying EVD. Finally, many infectious diseases have a seasonal component, but due to the fluctuating nature of the health system in this resource-poor nation and the incomplete IDSR reports available, we concluded that comparing suspect case reporting 1 year prior would be difficult to interpret. Despite these limitations, this study is valuable in that it suggests capacity of the IDSR for early identification of EVD outbreaks in a real-world outbreak setting and also identifies shortcomings that may prevent optimal functioning of this passive surveillance system. In a resource-poor nation such as DRC, utilising an established surveillance system such as IDSR to its fullest potential should be prioritized to make best use of the limited health care infrastructure currently available.
Conclusion
The potential utility of the IDSR system should be motivation for additional research quantifying its impact in EVD outbreak settings. Such research should evaluate the root cause of delayed laboratory confirmation and subsequently recommend action leading to effective information flow from local to centralised health system levels, facilitating earlier outbreak response. Effective implementation and utilisation of technology will be an essential element of this conversation, whether it be to assess the telephone, short message service (SMS), email or radio technologies already a part of the IDSR system, or to consider implementing new technologies, such as personal digital assistant (PDA) or mobile medicine capabilities. Training HCWs to recognise that IDSR malaria or typhoid cases, even during concurrent outbreaks, could be misclassified EVD or co-morbidities with EVD is essential. More consistent laboratory reporting as part of IDSR will also be an important means of catching emerging EVD outbreaks early. When clinical assessment of common, differentially diagnosed diseases (especially malaria and typhoid fever) are ruled out by negative laboratory testing and reporting, this can signal a potential EVD event to public health officials. Finally, understanding and addressing the cause of reporting gaps within individual HZs should be a priority to improve the quality of IDSR data. Due to both the widespread use of IDSR in 43 of 46 countries in the WHO AFRO region [12] and the increasing range of EVD on the African continent, recognising the value of IDSR and continuing to evaluate its function may provide profitable best practices for other countries contending with EVD.
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